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INTRODUCTION

The Uruguay Round of negotiations, concluded in April 1994,
institutionalized the World Trade Organization (WTO), authenticated a
"package" of Multilateral Trade Agreements,' and ushered "in a new era of
global economic cooperation [for dispute settlement that reflects] the
widespread desire to operate in a fairer and more open multilateral trading
system."2
Institutionalizing the WTO represents the erection of a "pillar of
international trade in the twenty-first century., 3 The WTO will act as an
umbrella organization for all of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
Packaging the Multilateral Trade Agreements will make each member of
GATT subject to the same three agreements - the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),4 the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).5 Generally, GATT 1947 had as a goal the
enhancement of trade through lower burdens on all GATT parties.6 To
accomplish this, GATT contains, in various articles, particularized agreements

1. The trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round, 12-15 April 1994, in Marrakesh,
Morocco, ended with the adoption of four Decisions, 33 I.L.M. 1265 (1994), and the
Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, 33 I.L.M. 1263 (1994), and with the presentation of the
Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round, the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1141 (1994), and the Plurilateral Agreements.
2.1 The Marrakesh Declaration, 33 I.L.M. 1263 (1994).
3. GA 77 Focus, no. 107 (May 1994) (quoting His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Sidi
Mohammed at the opening of the Ministerial Meeting on April 12).
4. General Agieements on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
GATT was signed in Geneva, Switzerland, October 30, 1947. The Tokyo Round of
Negotiations, 1979, was the seventh round and produced several side agreements to GATT.
The Uruguay Round of Negotiations, 1986, was the eighth round and set up a negotiating
group to research and advise the parties on possible changes to the dispute settlement system.
5. The TRIPs Agreement is in Annex IC of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.
6. GATT, supra note 4, pmbl. GATT seeks to accomplish this goal by: (1) encouraging
parties to set maximum tariff rates and sponsoring periodic rounds of tariff negotiations to
reduce those maximum rates; (2) banning quotas; and (3) requiring most-favored-nation
status, and national treatment to be given to imports. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement
in GA 7T, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 53 n.4 (1987); see also GATT, supra note 4, arts. I,
III, & XI.
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to address specific issues.7 The Tokyo Round reshaped the Anti-Dumping
Code 8 and concluded the first Subsidies Code. 9 The monumental Uruguay
Round changes to GATT, and specifically, to the Anti-Dumping and
Subsidies Codes, have been an "historic achievement ... [which] will
strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment,
employment and income growth throughout the world."10 Prior to the 1994
changes, a party to GATT could opt out of being a signatory to any of the
agreements." Now, accession to GATT is accession to the Anti-Dumping
and Subsidies Codes.
The specific rules for dispute settlement under GATT and both codes
were enhanced in 1994. "[O]n the tree of legal evolution [GATT's 1947]
adjudication machinery is still down at the level studied by legal
anthropologists, right alongside dispute resolution ceremonies practiced
among primitive societies."' 2 But the 1994 agreement is a creation that far
surpasses the machinery of the past. There are consultation and dispute
settlement procedures for the two specific agreements (the Anti-Dumping15
4
Code 13 and the Subsidies Code ) and for the General Agreement.

7. These agreements include: the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on
Agriculture, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). These
agreement have seen varying negotiation progress since 1947. Some are more recent additions
to GATT than others. Additionally, they have been acceded to individually by parties. It is
only under GATT 1994 that they have been packaged under GATT. Note, however, that
accession to the four plurilateral agreements is still optional on an individual basis. These
agreements cover: government procurement, civil aircraft, bovine meat, and diary.
8. The Kennedy Round initiated the negotiations of the Anti-Dumping Code in the
1960s. The Tokyo Round on Anti-Dumping Practices, entered into force 1 January 1980,
interprets the provisions of GATT Article VI and sets out the conditions under which a
country may impose ADDs as protection against dumped imports. GATT ACTIVITIES 1993
75 (1994). By the end of 1993, there were 25 parties to the anti-dumping agreement. Id. The
total number of anti-dumping investigations initiated by the Parties rose from 237 to 245 in
1992 to 1993. Id. For a statistical analysis of U.S. activities under the Code see TRADE
POLICY REVIEW: UNITED STATES 94-103 (1992) [hereinafter TRADE POLICY REVIEW].
9. GATT, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1979). The Tokyo
Round also resulted in other agreements on: customs valuation, government procurement, and
technical barriers to trade.
As of 1993, the Subsidies Agreement had 24 signatories. GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note
8, at 75. For a statistical analysis of U.S. activities, see TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note
8, at 103-08.
10. The Marrakesh Declaration, 33 I.L.M. 1263 (1994).
11. Therefore, if a signatory was in a conflict with a country that had not acceded to one
of the specific agreements but was a member of GATT, the only dispute settlement procedures
available would be those under the General Agreement.
12. Robert E. Hudec, Public InternationalEconomic Law: The Academy Must Invest, 1
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 5, 6 (1992).
13. Article VI of GATT constitutes the Anti-Dumping Code.
14. Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of GATT constitute the Subsidies Code.
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Signatories to the specific agreements may avail themselves to the dispute
settlement of those agreements, or may, depending on the stage of the
settlement procedures, 6 avail themselves to the dispute settlement of the
General Agreement. Because there were changes in regards to the AntiDumping Code, the Subsidies Code, and the general GATT dispute
procedures, this article will contrast the provisions of GATT 1947 and GATT
1994 for all three. Parts II, III, and IV discuss the Anti-Dumping Code, the
Subsidies Code, and the general GATT dispute procedures, respectively.
Additionally, Part V examines policy issues and controversies, such as the
current role of GATT, the potential demise of the new organization from
insolvable conflict, and threats to U.S. sovereignty, that are relevant to all
three of the dispute settlement frameworks.
II.

THE ANTI-DUMPING CODE,

GATT ARTICLE VI

Although the procedural changes to the GATT dispute resolution are the
focus of this article, an overview of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code's
substantive provisions and their relation to U.S. law is foundational.
A.

Substantive Overview

Article VI of GATT contains the substance of the GATT Anti-Dumping
Code. Broadly speaking, an importing country under Article VI can impose
an anti-dumping duty (ADD) against a dumped product - one that is being
sold in the importing country's domestic market for a value that is less than
the value in the market of the exporting country.
Although the substantive law of the importing member controls in its
administrative dumping determination, the basic substantive requirements of
GATT Article VI must be followed. 7 For example, in determining whether
ADDs should be imposed, a decisive factor is whether the importing country
15. Articles XXII and XXIII contain the general dispute resolution procedures. Article
XXII calls for the parties to engage in consultations. Article XXIII allows the parties to refer
a conflict to the Contracting Parties for dispute settlement.
16. There is a distinction between the Subsidies Code and the Anti-Dumping Code as to
when a party can initiate an action under the general GATT provisions, Articles XXII and
XXIII. Prior to initiating dispute resolution under GATT's general dispute settlement, a party
to an anti-dumping conflict must exhaust the procedures in the Anti-Dumping Code; this
restriction does not apply to the Subsidies Code.
17. GATT, supra note 4, art. VI 1 1. Although some of the substantive and procedural
changes to the Anti-Dumping Code were already reflected by U.S. custom, the U.S. Congress,
when it passed the implementing legislation for GATT 1994, had to bring some U.S. law into
conformity with the agreement. Terence P. Stewart, Uruguay Round Outlines: Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 2 (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). The changes in the administrative
procedures to determine dumping included providing expedited reviews for new shippers and
limiting the time periods of all reviews to those outlined in GATT 1994. Id,
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has found that its domestic industry has suffered injury." In a 1955 Panel
Report on "Swedish Anti-Dumping Duties," the Italian government asserted
that the Swedish decree did not reflect the considerations for a finding of
injury that were mandated by Article VI of GATT. Although the GATT
Panel recognized Swedish authority to determine the existence of dumping
activities, it concluded that such a determination must be in line with Article
VI's substantive guidelines.' 9 In 1985, a Panel reiterated its position that
national substantive law is subject to review under Articles VI and XXIII. 2 °
[T]he responsibility to make a determination of material injury
caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the
authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However,
... if a contracting party affected by the determination could make
a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of
causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting
party [should] ... be given sympathetic consideration and ... if no
satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES... . To conclude otherwise would give
government complete freedom and unrestricted discretion ... [and]
would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and
order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT.2
The majority of substantive and procedural requirements for the AntiDumping Code are expanded in Article VI's supporting agreements. The
18. TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 8, at 97.
19. GAI', ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE (6th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX] (quoting The 1955 Panel Report on Swedish Anti-

Dumping Duties).
It was clear from the wording of Article VI that no anti-dumping duties should be
levied unless certain facts had been established ....

The Panel agreed that if the

Swedish Decree was being applied in such a manner as to impose an anti-dumping
levy in the absence of dumping practices, the Italian Government ...

could claim

an impairment of benefits. The Swedish representative stated that it appeared
doubtful to his delegation that the CONTRACTING PARTIES could consider that
question and that it was the right of the national authorities to decide whether
dumping had really taken place. The Panel agreed that no provision of the General
Agreement could limit in any way the rights of national authorities in that respect.
But... it would be reasonable to expect from the contracting party which resorts
to the provisions of Article VI, if such action is challenged, to show the satisfaction
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES that it had exercised its rights consistently with
those provisions.
Id.

20. Note that the provisions of GATT Article XXIII are discussed at infra text accompanying notes 88-156.
21. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 19 (quoting The 1985 Panel Report on "New
Zealand - Imports of Electrical Transformers from Finland").
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Parties adopted the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to interpret Article VI, "to elaborate
rules for their application in order to provide greater uniformity and certainty
in their implementation[,] and . . .to provide for the speedy, effective and
equitable settlement of disputes arising under this Agreement.... 22 After
the 1994 changes, the Parties adopted a parallel agreement - the Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994.23 Although there are substantive 24 and procedural 25 changes
in the agreement that affect the national administrative determination of
dumping activities, the focus of this article is on the procedures governing
dispute settlement in GATT which are instigated to review the national
determination of dumping and authorization of ADDs.
B.

Dispute Settlement

There are several procedural steps that an exporting party to GATT 1994
may take if it considers that an importing Party has wrongfully imposed
ADDs under its domestic laws. In fact, the 1947 and the 1994 agreement

22. Agreement Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter 1947
Dumping Agreement].
23. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, publishedin GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 168 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Dumping Agreement].
24. Substantively, GATT 1994:
(1) is applicable to all members of the WTO, not just signatories to the anti-dumping
code (as has been the case under the 1967 and 1979 Codes); (2) provides more
uniformity in dumping calculus by member countries; [and] (3) clarifies the criteria
to be considered in an injury determination.
Stewart, supra note 17, at 1.
25. Procedurally, GATT 1994:
[1] establishes minimum transparency and due process requirements; [2] codifies
agreed principles for using information otherwise available and conditions and
procedures for verification of information; [3] clarifies the requirements for initiation
and subsequent conduct of an investigation; [4] specifies that investigations will be
terminated where dumping margins are de minimis (defined as less than 2%) or
where import volumes are negligible; [5] establishes maximum time limits for the
conduct of investigations and reviews and minimum time periods for responding to
questionnaires; [6] requires outstanding orders to be subject to reexamination on the
questions of dumping and injury each five years (but permits countries to treat all
outstanding orders as entered on the date the WTO takes effect); [8] leaves open the
question of what, if any, actions governments may take to deal with problems of
circumvention of orders; [9] provides new shippers with the opportunity to receive
expedited reviews to establish dumping liability; [and 10] requires countries to
provide judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals for review of antidumping
determinations.
Id. at 1-2.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/2
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have the same basic three-step process: consultation between the private
Parties, referral to the GATT institution, and review by a GATT panel.26
The most significant changes are in the third step.
1. Consultation Between the Private Parties
Both the 1947 and 1994 agreements direct the members to begin with
private consultations:
If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or
indirectly, under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or
that the achievement of any objective is being impeded, by other
Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the matter, request in writing consultations
with the Member or Members in question. Each Member shall
afford sympathetic consideration to any request from another
Member for consultations.2 7
The procedural application of consultation has not been changed.
2.

Referral to a GATT Institution

Under both the 1947 and 1994 agreements, the private consultations can
be followed by referral to a GATT institution in the same two circumstances
of alleged substantive violations 28 by the Member that instituted the antidumping proceedings.29 However, when one of the circumstances is

26. Article 15 of Consultation, Conciliation, and Dispute Settlement outlines the dispute
settlement procedures, which are comparable to the general dispute settlement procedures in
the 1994 Article 17 of Consultation and Dispute Settlement.
27. 1994 Dumping Agreement, supra note 23, art. 17
3; see also, 1947 Dumping

Agreement, supra note 22, art. 15 2. In the 1947 provision, the Members are called Parties,
and the last sentence in Paragraph 17.3 is not included in Paragraph 2; however, a similar
sentence is included under Paragraph I of the 1947 provision.

28. The substantive complaints are a nullified benefit or an impeded objective of GATT.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

29. The party that initiated the consultations will proceed in the following two circumstances:
[1] [When] the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations
...have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and [when] final action has
been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to levy
definitive anti-dumping duties or to accept price undertakings ... [or]
[2] When a provisional measure has a significant impact and the Member that
requested consultations considers that the measure was taken contrary to the
[guidelines of Article 7 Provisional Measures]. ...
1994 Dumping Agreement, supra note 23, art. 17, 4. The 1947 agreement incorporates the
same circumstances; although, the Members are referred to as Parties. 1947 Dumping
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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present, the 1947 and 1994 agreements allow for different proceedings. The
differences are in: who may proceed past consultations, where the
proceedings are to be brought, and the effect of bringing such proceedings.
First, under the 1947 agreement, either party may bring further
proceedings;30 whereas, under the 1994 agreement, the Member that had
initiated the consultations may proceed further.3 ' Second, under the 1947
agreement, the Party refers the matter to the Committee for conciliation;32
whereas, under the 1994 agreement, the Member refers the matter to the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the WTO.33 Third, under the 1947
agreement, the Committee for conciliation actually is required to take action
without further request by the Parties: "In cases where matters are referred
to the Committee for conciliation, the Committee shall meet within thirty
days to review the matter, and, through its good office, shall encourage the
Parties involved to develop a mutually acceptable solution. ' 34 Through this
process, the Parties are to facilitate conciliatory progress. 35 This conciliation step was deleted in the 1994 agreement.36
3. Review by a GATT Panel
The dispute is reviewed and settled by a GATT Panel. Of the two
changes in the panel procedures - party request for a panel and panel
review of the national decision - the latter is much more significant.
Under the 1947 agreement, the Committee for Conciliation must establish
a panel upon the request of any party to the dispute based on the following
information from both parties:
(a) a written statement of the Party making the request indicating
how a benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this
Agreement has been nullified or impaired, or that of the objectives
of the Agreement is being impeded, and
(b) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate
domestic
37
procedures to the authorities of the importing country.
Under the 1994 agreement, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is required

Agreement, supra note
30. 1947 Dumping
31. 1994 Dumping
32. 1947 Dumping
33. 1994 Dumping
34. 1947 Dumping
35. 1947 Dumping
36. 1994 Dumping
37. 1947 Dumping

22, art. 15
Agreement,
Agreement,
Agreement,
Agreement,
Agreement,
Agreement,
Agreement,
Agreement,

3.
supra note
supra note
supra note
supranote
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note
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22,
23,
22,
23,
22,
22,
23,
22,

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

15
17
15
17
15
15,
17.
15

3.
4.
3.
4.
3.
4.
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to establish a panel only upon
the request of the complaining party' but
39
based on the same criteria.
There is a new standard of review in the 1994 agreement.40 It provides
that the GATT panel must interpret a challenged national administrative
decision in a light most favorable to that decision. If the factual findings in
the administrative record were "proper" and determined in an "unbiased and
objective" manner, the panel must uphold them even if an alternative
conclusion could have been reached.4' In addition, if the legal conclusions
of the administrative body, with regard to Article VI, are consistent with
"public international law" and reflect a permissible, albeit not the best,
interpretation of the text, the panel must uphold them.42 President Clinton
stated that
[t]he addition of an explicit standard of review is, without doubt, the
most important aspect of the new anti-dumping agreement. It will
enable the United States to continue enforcing U.S. anti-dumping
laws, and, at the same time, give U.S. exporters a useful tool to
correct impermissible actions by foreign anti-dumping authorities.
The standard of review acknowledges that there may be more than
one permissible interpretation of the agreement or facts and requires

38. 1994 Dumping Agreement, supra note 23, art. 17 5.
39. 1994 Dumping Agreement, supra note 23, art. 17, 5(i)(ii). For the criteria, see
supra text accompaying note 37.
40. In the past, there has been a lack of clarity on the panel's standard of review.
[T]here have been efforts by some governments to have panels review
administrative findings for issues not raised before the government agency
conducting the original investigation or to introduce evidence that was not before
the fact finder.
The Dunkel Draft does not provide clarification of the standard of review,
scope of review or whether Article VI is properly construed as a derogation from
other GATT obligations or not. Language in the draft dispute settlement agreement
[Art. 1.2] may be helpful on the issue of construction generally.
It is absurd for our negotiators to be forced to negotiate a Code when the
benchmarks for evaluation of determinations and interpretations are so uncertain.
International agreements should not become unidentifiable traps.
While I have received informal indications that domestic concerns about the
GATT standard either misread existing case law or are not correct standards under
existing Code or the draft dispute settlement agreement, the issue is too fundamental
not to be resolved within the GATT final act.
HEARING ON THE DEC. 20, 1991 DRAFT FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,

H.R. DoC. No. 781, 102d Cong.,

2d Sess. (1992) (Statement of Terence P. Stewart, Esq.).
41. 1994 Dumping Agreement, supra note 23, art. 17,
42. Id. art. 17, 6(ii).

6(i).
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3

Authorized Retaliation

Article VI does not authorize counter-retaliatory actions against a country
that has wrongly imposed ADDs. However, a contracting party can
presumably proceed under GATT Article XXIII," because in the absence
of a specific provision in the 1947 and 1994 Anti-Dumping Codes and
supporting agreements, the general dispute settlement procedures of GATT
Article XXIII and those documents interpreting Article XXIII are binding.45
III.

THE SUBSIDIES CODE,

GATT ARTICLES VI, XVI, AND XXIII

An overview of the Subsidies Code, which consists of three GATT
articles, is appropriate prior to delving into the specific changes made in the
various dispute resolution procedures.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE OVERVIEW

Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade contain the substance of the Subsidies Code. Article XVI states that
if a party maintains one of the various types of subsidies, it shall notify the
CONTRACTING PARTIES 46 of the extent, nature, and effect of the
subsidy. Thus, if another party to GATT contends that the authorized
subsidy is having harmful effects or hindering the objectives of GATT, 47 it
can proceed to Article XVI's dispute settlement in GATT. Article VI allows
a country to levy a countervailing duty (CVD) "for the purpose of offsetting
any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufac-

43. Executive Summary Results of the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263 (1993).
44. Theodore W. Kassinger, Introduction and Bibliography to the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, I.E.L. I-B-2
(1989); see infra notes 88-156 and accompanying text for analysis of Article XXIII.
45. 1994 Dumping Agreement, supra note 23, art. 17 1 (incorporating the provisions
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, to the extent of their consistency with the special
rules under the Anti-Dumping Code); 1947 Dumping Agreement, supra note 22, art. 15 7
(incorporating the provisions of the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, to the extent of their consistency with Article VI
procedures).
46. The reference to "CONTRACTING PARTIES" is used when the parties to GATr act
as a whole, e.g., passing an amendment. The reference to "Contracting Parties," however, is
used when the individual countries act individually, e.g., applying domestic anti-dumping or
countervailing duty law.
47. For example, if an export subsidy allows the exporting country to capture more than
an equitable share of the world market, then the subsidy would extend its authorization under
Article XVI. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XVI.
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turer, production or export of any merchandise."4' "[N]othing in the terms
of Section B of Article XVI, relating to export subsidies, should be
considered . . .as affecting in any way the right of a contracting party to
impose countervailing and anti-dumping duties." 9
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures" outlines
rules regarding when and how a signatory can use subsidies.5' Additionally,
it authorizes and places certain substantive52 and procedural53 restraints on

48. Id. art. VI 2. The Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1980. The 1994
Subsidies Agreement "contains a definition of subsidy (i.e., either a financial contribution or
any form of income or price support where a benefit is conferred) and introduces the concept
of 'specificity' (i.e., only subsidies specific to an enterprise or industry or groups thereof
would be subject to discipline)." Terence P. Stewart, Uruguay Round Outlines: Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
49. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supranote 19, at 228 (citing The Report of the 1954-55
Review Working Party on "Other Barriers to Trade" and noting that the Review Working
Party drafted Article XVI § B).
50. There is a comparable 1994 agreement by the Parties: Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, publishedin, GATT SECRETARIAT, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 264 (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 Subsidies Agreement]; see also, H.R. DOC. No. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994).
51. There is a comparable 1947 agreement by the Parties: Agreement on the Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter 1947
Subsidies Agreement].
52. Substantively, the 1994 Subsidies Agreement
[1] in countervailing duty (CVD) actions, provides guidance on calculations for
provision of equity capital, loans by governments, loan guarantees and the provision
of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government (Article 14); [2] clarifies
the criteria to be considered in an injury determination in CVD investigations.
Stewart, supra note 48, at 2.
53. Procedurally, the 1994 Subsidies Agreement
[1] establishes minimum transparency and due process requirements; [2] codifies
agreed conditions and procedures for verification of information; [3] clarifies the
requirements for initiation (including standingrequirements) and subsequent conduct
of an investigation; [4] specifies that investigations will be terminated where subsidy
rates de minimis (defined as less than 1% for developed countries, and 2 or 3% for
developing and least-developed countries, respectively) or where import volumes are
negligible; [5] establishesmaximum time limits forthe conduct of investigations and
reviews and minimum time periods for responding to questionnaires; [6] requires all
outstanding orders to be subject to reexamination on the questions of subsidies and
injury each five years (but permits countries to treat all outstanding orders as entered
on the date the WTO takes effect; [7] leaves open the question of what, if any,
actions governments may take to deal with problems of circumvention of orders; [8]
provides new shippers with the opportunity to receive expedited reviews to establish
an individual CVD rate; and, [9] requires countries to provide judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals for review of countervailing duty determinations.
Id. at 2-3.
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the use of CVDs against signatories that step out of those rules. The
Agreement further provides a mechanism for dispute settlement and
surveillance with regard to subsidies and countervailing measures. 4
B.

Dispute Settlement

The general dispute settlement provision under the 1994 Subsidies
Agreement is brief: "The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT
1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall
apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement,
except as otherwise specifically provided herein." 5 However, both the
1994 and 1947 Agreements contain specific provisions that correspond to
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement. When a member has
reason to believe that another member is granting a subsidy, the GATT
articles that it would use depend on two factors - the type of remedy sought
and the type of subsidy challenged.
The remedy sought can be either authorized by the CONTRACTING
PARTIEES or unilateral on the part of the member. Authorized action, such
as countermeasures, originate in GATT Article XVI. 6 The Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, under Parts II, III, and IV,explain,
respectively, prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies, and non-actionable
subsidies.57 Alternatively, unilateral action, such as countervailing duties

54. GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 8, at 77.
55. 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, pt. X art. 30.
56. Article XVI of the GATT Agreement is titled "Subsidies" and is a general prohibition
against granting subsidies. Article XVI(A)(I) authorizes a party that suffers serious prejudice
as a result of a member's subsidies to request that the CONTRACTING PARTIES limit the
subsidy. The procedure for such request is not set forth in the general agreement; therefore,
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is referenced.
57. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures contains the procedures for
obtaining authorization for countermeasures against a prohibited subsidy, an actionable
subsidy, and a non-actionable subsidy, in Parts II, III, and IV, respectively. For clarity sake,
the subsidies will be referred to as: Part II prohibited subsidies, Part III actionable subsidies,
and Part IV non-actionable subsidies.
Part II Prohibited subsidies (also called "red light" subsidies) are those such as export
subsidies, de facto export subsidies, and subsidies contingent upon the use of local content;
Part III Actionable subsidies (also called "yellow light" subsidies) are those that cause
injury to an industry of another party of GATT, nullify or impair the benefits of another party
of GATT, or cause serious prejudice; and
Part IV Non-actionable subsidies (also called "green light" subsidies) include certain
government assistance for industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, for
regional development, and for the adaption of existing plant and equipment to new environmental requirements. 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, arts. 3, 5, 8.
It should be noted that the 1947 Subsidies Agreement does not refer directly to these
three types of subsidies. However, there are corresponding articles that outline types of
subsidies that are treated with similarity. For example, non-actionable subsidies are reflected
in the 1947 agreement as those "subsidies other than export subsidies [that] are widely used
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(CVDs), originate in GATT Article VI.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures explains under
Part V the procedure for imposing CVDs and the dispute mechanisms for
wrongfully imposed CVDs.58 The dispute settlement mechanisms for
authorized countermeasures are distinctively different than those for
reviewing unilateral CVDs, even though both Articles remedy subsidies.
This is because the countermeasure provisions are initiated directly in GATT,
while the CVD reviews, like the anti-dumping reviews, 59 are invoked
following a national administrative determination of subsidies.
1. GATT-Authorized Countermeasures
A Member that believes that a subsidy is being granted or maintained by
"another signatory must initially invoke consultations, and the Member
granting the subsidy must enter the consultations.6' Following consultations, the remedies are divergent depending on the type of subsidy involved:
Part II for prohibited subsidies, Part III for actionable subsidies, or Part IV
for non-actionable subsidies.
For Part II prohibited subsidies, 6' the 1947 agreement allows for referral
to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. If the
Committee finds that the challenged Member is using a prohibited subsidy,
the Committee "shall make such recommendations to the parties as may be

as important instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives." 1947
Subsidies Agreement, supra note 5 1, art. 11 1. Additionally, actionable subsidies are similar
to those that, in the 1947 Agreement, cause injury to another's domestic market or impair
another's rights under the General Agreement, including those subsidies that are prone to give
the "signatory granting [the] subsidy. . . more than an equitable share of world market trade
in such product." Id. art. 8 3, art. 10 1. Finally, the prohibited subsidies are the same as
those export subsidies, in the 1947 agreement, on products other than certain primary products.
Id. art. 9 1. There is an illustrative list of these prohibited subsidies in both the 1994 and
1947 agreements. See 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, annex I; see also 1947
Subsidies Agreement, supra note 51, annex (a)-(l). Because of these similarities, the subsidies
will retain the 1994 titles hereinafter.
58. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act allows the U.S. Trade
Representative to impose duties or restrictions regardless of simultaneous GATT dispute
settlement procedures being conducted. The EC does not follow such practice and has
objected to the United State's imposition of such duties during GATT review.
A brief outline of the terms is given for clarity. While Article XVI of the GATT
Agreement is part of the Subsidies Code, so is Article VI, "Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties." The procedure for Article VI CVDs is in Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. Reference will be made to Part V CVDs.
59. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
60. For the authorization of consultations over the three types of subsidies in the 1994
Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, arts. 4, 7, 9.
61. For a definition see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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appropriate" 62 and it may authorize countermeasures if the recommendations
are not complied with.6 3
The 1994 agreement allows a party to elect arbitration under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) or elect referral to the Dispute Settlement
Body which would then establish a panel. 64 The panel may use the PGE;
however, the PGE report must be adopted by the panel regardless of panel
disapproval.6 5
The most significant change is what happens after the panel issues its
report. Under GATT 1994, the panel report receives automatic approval by
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within thirty days unless: (1) the Dispute
66
Settlement Body (DSB) blocks it by consensus, or (2) either party appeals.
The first option is not likely to occur, but the second option is a new right
that may be frequently invoked. The decision of the Appellate Body report
then receives automatic approval by the DSB unless the DSB blocks it by
consensus. 67 The 1994 recommendations and countermeasure provisions are
substantially the same as the 1947 provisions.68
For Part III actionable subsidies, 69 the 1947 agreement allows for review
by the Committee similar to the prohibited subsidy reviews. The 1994
agreement closely parallels the 1994 provisions for prohibited subsidies.70
However, it extends the allotted time and does not make provisions for use
of the PGE.7'
For Part IV non-actionable subsidies, 72 the 1944 agreements, after
consultation, allow the requesting Member to refer the matter to the
Committee.73 If the Member granting or maintaining the subsidy program
does not comply with the Committee's recommendations within six months,
the Committee must authorize countermeasures.74
2.

UnilaterallyInvoked CountervailingDuties (CVDs)

If a Member is granting or maintaining a subsidy that would be subject
to the provisions of Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter62. 1947 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 51, art. 13 T 4. The Committee is to consider
the special needs of developing countries in its recommendations. Id.
63. Id.
64. The DSB can fail to establish a panel only by a consensus vote.
65. 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, art. 4 5.
66. Id. art. 4 8.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 4 10.
69. For a definition see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
70. 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, art. 7 1-10.
71. Id.
72. For a definition see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
73. 1994 Subsidies Agreements, supra note 50, art. 9 3.
74. Id. art. 9 4.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/2
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vailing Measures, regarding CVDs, the Member complaining of subsidies
initiates its complaint in its own domestic tribunals rather than the WTO.
Furthermore, the Member is not required to wait for authorization from the
WTO before imposing CVDs. In this respect, Article VI CVD proceedings
to remedy subsidies more closely resemble the anti-dumping proceedings to
remedy dumping,75 as opposed to Article XVI countermeasure proceedings
to remedy subsidies.7 6
After a member invokes its domestic administrative investigation, it must
immediately invite the Member that is subject to the investigations for
consultations "with the aim of clarifying the situation as to the matters
referred. .. .," If the exporting country, which had initially granted the
subsidies, loses in the administrative review of the importing country and
gets CVDs levied against it, it may proceed under the third article that
comprises the GATT Subsidies Code, Article XXIH. 7 s
The softwood lumber disputes between the United States and Canada
illustrate how a seemingly straight-forward code can become particularly
egregious without distinctive, binding dispute settlement procedures.79 In
this case, there were continual negotiations and settlement agreements
between the parties, and there were multiple complaints and countercomplaints filed with the GATT Subsidies Committee by both parties.80 In
1982, the International Trade Administration (ITA) began an investigation of
Canadian pricing practices that were alleged to constitute a subsidy; it was
not until 1992, that the ITA issued a final determination against Canada. The
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures adopted a panel report
in 1993,81 after over ten years had lapsed. Additionally, both Canada and
the United States had serious reservations about certain aspects of the report,
even though neither country blocked its adoption. 2 "The significance of
the softwood lumber cases is that they underscore the 'need for . . . a
mechanism to resolve disputes."'8 3 GATT 1994 Article XXIII may add
some of the definitiveness needed for disputes such as these.

See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
See infra part III.B.1.
1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, art. 13 1.
See supra notes 88-152 and accompanying text.
For an overview of the issues involved and the various complaints filed, see TERENCE
STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 828-30 (1993).
80. Id.
81. GATT AcTVITIES, supra note 8, at 78.
82. Id. at 47.
83. STEWART, supra note 79, at 830.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

P.
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3. Election
A Member can not invoke both Article XVI countermeasures, and Article
VI CVDs. It must elect between the two.
The provisions of Part II [prohibited subsidies] or [Part] III [actionable subsidies] may be invoked in parallel with the provisions of Part
V [CVDs]; however, with regard to the effects of a particular subsidy
in the domestic market of the importing Member, only one for relief
(either a countervailing duty, if the requirements of Part V are met,
or a countermeasure under [Parts II or III]) shall be available.84
C.

Comparisonof Changes in the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes

Article VI addresses anti-dumping and was most significantly changed
by the addition of the standard of review favorable to the national administrative finding. Article XVI addresses GATT authorized countermeasures, and the 1994 changes provide that panel reports will be
automatically adopted and that parties have a right of appeal. Article VI
authorizes self-initiated CVDs and did not undergo significant changes with
regard to dispute settlement. Therefore, in evaluating these three dispute
settlement procedures, it appears that Article XVI countermeasures underwent
a greater degree of change than those for Article VI ADDs and CVDs. s5
The changes to the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes, Articles VI and
XVI, should, however, be evaluated in light of the changes to the general
GATT dispute resolution provisions, Articles XXII and XXIII. This is
because these general dispute resolution provisions and their interpretive
agreements are applicable to the specific Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes'
dispute resolution when consistent with the terms of the specific codes or
their interpretive agreements.8 6 Thus, it is necessary to consider the

84. 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, pt. V n.35.
85. A right of appeal to the Appellate Body was incorporated into the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures with regard to the subsidies under Article XVI but was
not incorporated into the same agreement for CVDs and was not incorporated into the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 for ADDs.
86. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.
M. 1226, annex 2, art. 1 2 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing the WTO]. "To the extent
that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of this Understanding and the
special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 2, the special or additional
rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail." Appendix 2 lists the Agreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI of GATT 1994 and specifically references Article 17, paragraphs
17.4 - 17.7 of such agreement. See generallysupra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
Appendix 2 also lists the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and
specifically references the following provisions: paragraphs 4.2 - 4.12, 6.6, 7.2 - 7.10, 8.5,
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss2/2
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provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII to determine whether any of the 1994
revisions are consistent with and will significantly alter the special dispute
settlement provisions of Article VI."7
IV. GENERAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, GATT ARTICLES XXII AND XXIII
Articles XXII and XXIII constitute the general dispute settlement
provisions of GAIT 88 and can be implicated in various scenarios.8 9

24.4, 27.7, Annex V, and note 35.
87. Because the dispute settlement provisions for Article XVI are extensive, there will be
little occasion to utilize Articles XXII and XXIII. However, the provisions for Article VI are
not as extensive and would, therefore, be less likely to conflict with GATT's general dispute
resolution procedures.
88. The text of Article XXIII reads:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view
to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in
paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter
so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting
parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties,
with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such
consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the
circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a
contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party
or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any
contracting party of any concession or other obligations in fact suspended, that
contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is
take, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES if its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal
shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is
received by him.
GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIII.
89. Following are some examples:
If Country A grants subsidies to an exported product, Country B may, in some
instances, unilaterally impose CVDs on Country A, such as under Article VI. Country A may
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Basically, the general provisions can be invoked by a member of GATT that
believes a benefit accruing to it under GATT is being nullified or impaired
by another member of GATT.9 ° Although there is authorization for the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to investigate, recommend measures, and
authorize possible retaliatory action, Article XXIII only provides a basic
outline of authority and rights - it does not establish procedural formalities.
The procedures have been developed over a period of time and formalized
in documents subsequent to the adoption of GATT. The Tokyo Round
produced the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance.9
Later, in 1982, the GATT Ministerial
Declaration on Dispute Settlement was released.92
The 1994 procedures for the general resolution of disputes under Articles
XXII and XXIII have been so extensively changed that a provision-byprovision comparison, as done for the procedures for ADDs and CVDs,
would be confusing at best. Therefore, the key GATT 1994 provisions
follow an overview of the GATT 1947 provisions. 93
A.

GATT 1947

Under GATT 1947, the dispute settlement consists of two general stages:
(1) diplomatic consultations directly between the disputing parties, and (2)
institutional processes before a GATT panel.
1. Consultations
The consultation provisions of Article XXII: 1 concern "representations
... with respect to any matter affecting the operation of [GATT]."

94

Article XXIII:1 consultation can be used when a party believes that its

then proceed to WTO dispute settlement under Articles XXII and XXIII.
For subsidies under Article XVI, Country B will not be able to unilaterally impose
countermeasures. In such instances, Country B would have to proceed in the WTO under the
procedures specifically applicable under Article XVI. In such a circumstance, Articles XXII
and XXIII could be utilized to the extent that they are not inconsistent with Article XVI.
Also, Country B may proceed under Article XXIII in cases where it has exhausted its remedies
under the specific subsidies dispute settlement provisions and has not been able to secure
observance of results by Country A. See generallyAgreement Establishing the WTO, supra
note 86, annex 2, art. 22 9.
90. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIII 1.
91. B.I.S.D. 210 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter 1979 Understanding].
92. B.I.S.D. 13 (29th Supp. 1983) [hereinafter 1982 Declaration].
93. See, e.g., JoHN HOWARD JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969);
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 351-75
(1969); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 5998 (1975).
94. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXII 1.
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benefit under GATT is being nullified or impaired, 95 or a GATT objective
is being impeded. 96 Either the general consultation provision of Article
XXII or an alternative provision9 7 must be used before proceeding to
dispute resolution under Article XXIII:2. Some of the pivotal developments
in the area of consultations concern the ability of parties to expedite
consultations and to proceed to dispute settlement if the consultations prove
fruitless.
The interpretation of Article XXII, which allows for bilateral and
multilateral consultation, has become more defined. The 1979 Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and Surveillance
added some interpretive provisions, but many of the additions regarding
expediting consultations and time restraints were laudatory and undefinable:
Contracting parties reaffirm their resolve to strengthen and improve
the effectiveness of consultative procedures employed by contracting
parties. In that connection, they undertake to respond to requests for
consultations promptly and to attempt to conclude consultations
expeditiously, with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory
conclusions.98
These relative time "suggestions" were later given more of a definitive
context. The 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute
Settlement Rules and Procedures provides:
If a request is made under Article XXII: 1 ... the contracting party
to which the request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed,
reply to the request within ten days after its receipt and shall enter
into consultations in good faith within a period of no more than
thirty days from the date of the request .... 9'
In February 1994, the Parties decided to maintain these limitations until the
entry into force of the 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. °
In addition to the more definitive rules on time, the rules have become
95. For explanation, see GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 19, at 606-07.

96. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIII

1. For explanation, see GATT, ANALYTICAL

INDEX, supra note 19, at 607-08.

97. The following GATT Articles and paragraphs require contracting parties to consult
on certain occasions: 11:5; VI:7; VII:l; VIII:2; IX:6; XII:4; XIII:4; XVI:4; XVIII:7, 12, 16,
21, 22; XIX:2; XXIII; XXIV:7; XXV:I; XXVII; XXVIII:1, 4; XXXVII:2.
98. 1979 Understanding, supra note 91.
99. Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
B.I.S.D. 61, 62 C.l (36th Supp. 1989).
100. See Agreement Establishing the WTO, supra note 86, at annex 2.
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stricter about not allowing one party to block progression past conciliation.
The 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules
and Procedures, with regard to the relationship between Article XXII and
Article XXIII consultations, provides:
If the consultations under Article XXII: 1 or XXIII: 1 fail to settle a
dispute within sixty days after the request for consultations, the
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel or a
working party under Article XXIII:2. The complaining party may
request a panel or a working party during the sixty-day period if the
parties jointly
consider that consultations have failed to settle the
01
dispute.
This language appears to allow one member to block the formation of a panel
by deciding that the consultations, at the time that the panel is requested by
the opposite member, are not final. The Legal Adviser to the DirectorGeneral addressed this issue by saying that, in his view, it is "not necessary
that both parties so agree before moving to set up a panel under Article
XXIII:2[;] such a condition would mean that one member could indefinitely
block the procedures simply by saying that bilateral consultations had not yet
been terminated."'0 2 Thus, if private consultations under Article XXII or
XXIII fail, a party may request additional consultations in a GATT body.'0 3
2.

Panel Processes

Actions of panels are to comply with the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes for panel formation, panel
procedures, and consideration and adoption of panel reports.' °4
After failure of diplomatic consultation and negotiations, the aggrieved
member may request the formation of a panel. However, under GATT 1947
there is no absolute right to such a panel because the responding member has
the opportunity to put forth evidence that such a panel would be premature
or inequitable under the circumstances, and because the contracting parties
may consider formation of the panel fruitless.'0 5 Under GATT 1947, a

101. Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
B.I.S.D. 61, 62 (36th Supp. 1989).
102. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 19, at 571.
103. 1979 Understanding, supra note 91, at 210 8.
104. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Under
Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at 5.1-.23, in Draft
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Dec. 20, 1991, GAAT Doc. MTN TNC/w/FA.
105. 1979 Understanding, supra note 91, at 210, annex 4 (stating that "[b]efore bringing
a case, contracting parties have exercised their judgment as to whether action under Article
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member can block the establishment of a panel, because although a member
may request "the establishment of a panel to assist the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to deal with the matter, the CONTRACTING PARTIES... decide
on its establishment in accordance with standing practice."',0 6 Its practice
is to take action by consensus. However, automatic establishment of panels
is not one of the most significant changes, because panels are almost always
formed. °7
Once formed, the function of the panel "is to assist the CONTRACTING
PARTIES in discharging their responsibilities under Article XXIII:2.' ' s
The panel does so by issuing a report which consists of an assessment of the
facts and applicable GATT provisions.'0 9 Prior to such an issuance,
however, the parties submit written statements or briefs for the panel to
consider. Although panel reports will vary in their degree of involvement,
analysis of the issues, and amount of remedial provisions, the reports are
authorized to contain recommendations about: how the offending measures
should be eliminated; whether any amount of compensation is necessary; and,
whether retaliation is warranted. 10 The panel report is submitted to the
parties in the action and to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, but the report is
only given consideration, unless adopted by consensus."' Panel reports
2
are, therefore, not ultimately binding."
If the recommendations are not followed, the complainant can ask the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to make suitable efforts to find a different
solution. "The CONTRACTING PARTIES should take appropriate action
... [and] keep under surveillance any matter on which they have made
recommendations or given rulings."' 1 3 Although, the alternative solution,
just like the panel's initial findings, is not binding." 4 Thus, a serious
defect in the 1947 dispute settlement procedures is that one member can
block formation of a panel, adoption of a report, and authorization for

XXIII:2 would be fruitful").
106. Id. at 212 10. This Understanding, which incorporated years of experience with the
dispute settlement procedures, considerably strengthened and clarified GATT Article XXIII.
It stated that the consultations should be conducted "in good faith in an effort to resolve the
disputes," and concluded expeditiously "with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory
conclusions." Id. at 210.
107. Davey, supra note 6, at 92.
108. 1979 Understanding, supra note 91, at 213 16.
109. Id.
110. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIII 2; 1979 Understanding, supra note 91, at 210,
annex, 4. The Retaliation measures have only been authorized under GATT Article XXII
one time.
111. 1979 Understanding, supra note 91, at 214 21.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 214
21-22.
114. Id. at214 22.
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retaliatory action.
In addition to the consensus requirement, GATT 1947 has other
procedural stumbling blocks. There is often considerable delay in the
formation of a panel, because the parties to the dispute have a right of
consultation in the selection of panel members." 5 Ultimately, "[t]he major
source of delay is foot dragging by one party in providing information or
otherwise participating in the procedure."' 1 6 Regardless of where it occurs,
delay is a significant flaw in GATT 1947. Also, there is no avenue for
appeal in GATT 1947 Article XXIII, and the CONTRACTING PARTIES
have never established precise time requirements for the different phases of
dispute settlement." 7 Principle defects with the GATT dispute settlement
process have been summarized as follows: "(i) lack of use; (ii) delays in the
establishment of panels; (iii) delays in appointing panel members; (iv) delays
in the adoptions of panel reports; (v) uncertain quality and neutrality of
panelists and panel reports; (vi)' 18blocked panel reports; and, (vii) nonimplementation of panel reports."
Previews of the changes in GATT 1994 began with the adoption of the
1986 Punta del Este Declaration in the Uruguay Round, which established a
special negotiating group to improve and strengthen GATT dispute settlement
procedures and to extend ways for facilitating compliance with panel
recommendations." 9 The Dunkel Draft 2 contained significant sugges-

115. Id. at 210 11.
116. Davey, supra note 6, at 93. However, in the anti-dumping and CVD cases, the panels
are likely to proceed on the parties "best information available." Id. at 93 n. 179.
117. 1979 Understanding, supra 91, at 218, annex 6(ix). Although, the 1979 Understanding states that most disputes are settled within three to nine months. Id. at 218 n.l.
118. Davey, supra note 6, at 81-89.
119. Punta Del Este Declaration, 25 I.L.M. 1624 (1986).
120. The Dunkel Draft was foundational to GATT 1994. Some of the significant
provisions in the Dunkel Draft are the following:
Right to Panel: Automatic establishment of panels unless by consensus,
Council agrees otherwise; panels established by the second meeting following the
initial request
Arbitration: Disputing parties may agree to resort to arbitration to solve
disputes; third parties may intervene if the original parties agree; may be used to
determine time frame for implementation and to determine level of trade coverage
for retaliatory purposes
Adoption of Panel Reports: Automatic adoption of panel reports unless by
consensus Council agrees otherwise; disputing parties may participate in consideration of the report; and may submit written objections to the reports at least 10
days prior to the consideration by the Council
Implementation of Adopted Reports: Within 30 days of adoption, the
defending party must notify the Council of plans for implementation; if unable to
comply immediately, it must comply within a reasonable period of time approved
by the Council, determined by agreement among the disputing parties, or determined
by binding arbitration
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tions for integrated dispute settlement, which would harmonize the various
provisions in GATT for settlement under the Multilateral Agreements 2 '
and under the Plurilateral Agreements.'2 2
B.

GATT 1994

To directly address some of the problems of GATT 1947,123 GATT
1994 makes various changes that indicate the parties' willingness to take
24
more of a legal rather than diplomatic approach to dispute settlement.
GATT 1994 creates an integrated system of dispute settlement, largely
eliminates the consensus requirement,'2 5 applies stricter time limita-

Compensation and Retaliation: Automatic authorization for retaliation within
thirty days from expiration of designated time period for implementation unless by
consensus the Council agrees otherwise
Appellate Review: Appellate review of panel reports limited to issues of law
and panel interpretation; third parties are not permitted to invoke appeals process;
automatic adoption of appellate body reports unless within 30 days of its issuance
by consensus, Council agrees otherwise
Rights of Third Parties: Third parties having a 'substantial interest' in a
matter and after notifying the Council of their intent, may be heard and submit
written communications to the panel
Non-violation complaints: The same procedures will be followed for nonviolation and violation complaints, except in non-violation complaints, the
complainant must submit a "detailed justification for its claim, despite a finding of
nullification or impairment, the defending party need not remove a GATT consistent
measure
Commitment to Refrain from Unilateral Action: Contracting Parties must
resort to GATT dispute settlement to determine whether existence of a GATT
violation and nullification or impairment; parties must determine the time period for
implementation according to GATT procedures; parties must seek Council
authorization according to GATT procedures before retaliating
Treatment of [LDCs]: Developing countries may invoke the 1966 Procedures;
special needs of developing countries should be considered in resolving disputes; in
disputes involving developing country members, upon request one panelist must be
a developing country representative; when least-developed countries are involved in
disputes, other parties must "exercise due restraint in acting against these members.
STEWART, supra note 79, at 60-65 (summarizing, in addition to.the provisions of the Dunkel
Draft, the positions of the United States, the EC, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and various
developing countries).
121. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its side agreements, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Trade Related Aspects of
International Property (TRIPS).
122. The Plurilateral Agreements cover the following topics: government procurement, civil
aircraft, bovine meat, and dairy.
123. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
124. The combination of these changes has been referred to as the "legalization" of dispute
resolution. This term is used to identify a system that follows a more legal approach as
opposed to a diplomatic approach. See infra notes 154-5& and accompanying text.
125. A member can no longer block: formation of a panel, adoption of a panel report,
authorization of retaliation, or time limitations for each step.
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tions, 11 6 grants a right of appeal, and allows a cross-retaliation remedy. 27
1. Integrated System of Dispute Settlement
The WTO Agreement establishes an umbrella organization that will apply
institutional rules to all of the multilateral trade agreements. 28 In joining
the WTO Agreement, a Member "agrees to the definitive application of the
obligations of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreements. 1 29 The
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will settle disputes for all of the agreements
under a fully integrated dispute settlement system; the same procedures will
apply to all the provisions negotiated in the Round, subject to any special
a
provisions. This will prevent forum shopping between agreements agreement
had
its
own
the
Tokyo
Rounds
because
each
problem under
0
procedures.13

2.

Panel Action and Appeal

Actions of panels, as under the 1947 agreement, are to comply with the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes with regard to: panel establishment, panel procedures, and adoption

126. Overall, it is now possible to adopt a panel report within 14 months, or less.
127. There will be better enforcement of U.S. rights because the Dispute Settlement
Understanding
significantly improves the existing system by providing strict time limits for each
step in the dispute settlement process. The effectiveness of the system is also
improved through provisions guaranteeing a right to a panel, adoption of panel
reports unless there is a consensus to reject the report, appellate review of the legal
aspects of a report upon request, time limits on when a Member must bring its laws
into conformity with panel rulings and recommendations and authorization of
retaliation in the event that a Member has not brought its laws in conformity with
its obligations within that set period of time. There will be a single system that will
apply the strengthened rules and procedures to all disputes with only minor
exceptions. A single panel will now be able to address all issues raised under any
of the covered agreements. Public access to information about the disputes is
increased.
Executive Summary Results of the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
58 Fed. Reg. 67,263 (1993).
128. Under the WTO, there will be a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which will retain
all authority to "establish panels, adopt panel and appellate reports, maintain surveillance of
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize retaliatory measures in cases
of non-implementation of recommendations." GATT Focus, no. 107, at 12 (May 1994).
129. Executive Summary Results of the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263 (1993). Although, accession to the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements remains optional.
130. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, GATIT MACHINERY AND THE TOKYO ROUND
AGREEMENTS

(1983).
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3
and appeal of panel reports.' '
Many of the delaying elements of panel establishment have been
eliminated. The DSB must establish a panel no later than the second time
it considers a panel request, unless there is a consensus against establishment.
Thus, the country subject to the complaint can no longer block panel

formation.

32

The WTO Secretariat makes three suggestions to the parties for
panelists. 133 If parties cannot agree within twenty days, the Director
General will appoint the panelists. For developing countries, if the Member
34
so requests, one panelist can be selected from the developing country.
There are standard terms of reference. 135 The panel may proceed under
different terms of reference only if the parties agree.'36 After the panelists
and the terms of reference are agreed upon, the time it takes the panel to
make a decision and give its report to the parties cannot exceed six
months. 37 After the panel submits the report to the parties, it submits it
to the DSB. The time for consideration has been limited;3 however, it may
be extended for developing countries if the parties agree. 1
One of the most significant changes to the dispute settlement procedures
is the elimination of the consensus requirement for adoption of panel reports.
The panel report has to be adopted by the DSB between twenty to sixty days
after circulation to parties,
unless a party appeals or there is a consensus not
139
report.
the
adopt
to
40
Either party is authorized to make an appeal to the Appellate Body.
The appeal is limited to issues of law covered in the panel report, and the
DSB must adopt an Appellate Report within thirty days, unless there is a

131. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex
2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, published in, GATT
SECRETARIAT, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS, 404 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Understanding]; see also H.R. Doc. NO. 103-

316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1654 (1994).
132. 1994 Understanding, supra note 131, annex 2 art. 4.
133. Id. art. 8, at 1231 (stating that these three should be qualified: having previously
participated in a panel proceeding, having been a representative to the GATT, or having taught
international trade law).
134. Id. art. 8 10, at 1232.
135. Id. art. 7, at 1230.
136. Id. art. 7, at 1230.
137. Id. art. 12, at 1233 (limiting the time for perishable goods to three months). Note that
in arriving at its decision, the panel can still use an Expert Review Group. The review group
must meet with the parties and with third parties. Id.
138. Id. art. 12 10, at 1234.
139. Id. art. 16, at 1235. Parties can state in writing their objections to the report, but this
will not have the effect of unilaterally blocking the report.
140. Id. art. 17, at 1236. Members of the Appellate Body serve four-year terms and must
not be affiliated with any government.
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14 1
consensus not to adopt the report.

3.

Remedies

The losing party will be given a "reasonable period of time" to
implement the panel recommendations.142 "[P]rompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.' 43 If they
are not implemented within this time, the winning party can further negotiate
an amount of compensation pending full implementation, or if there is not an
agreement within twenty days, the party can request that the DSB authorize
suspension of concessions or other retaliation.'"
A significant addition to the 1994 agreement is the authorization for
cross-retaliation. Under GATT 1947, the Multilateral Trade Agreements
were distinct, and in order to be bound by each one, a country had to accede
to each one. With the 1994 changes, the Multilateral Trade Agreements have
been "packaged" and a member that accedes to the General Agreement will
knowingly accede to each agreement. The preferred retaliatory action is
within the same agreement and the same sector. If that is not possible, then
retaliation may be effected within the same agreement, but in a different
sector. That was all that the 1947 arrangement would allow. Under GATT
1994, if those two alternatives are not possible, then retaliation can be
authorized within a different agreement.
If the losing member objects to the retaliation, it can proceed to
arbitration. The arbitration procedure is conducted by the original panel
members or by an arbitrator appointed by the WTO Director-General.145
The findings of arbitration are to be adopted by the DSB and implemented,
unless, by consensus, the DSB rejects the arbitration findings.' 46 The
arbitration procedure is available only for the issue of when a party must
comply with panel and DSB recommendations. It is not for the issue of
whether the party is ultimately liable to comply with the recommendations
because "liability" - or noncompliance with the terms of GATT - is
locked in by adoption of a disfavorable panel or appellate report.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. The total time for the appeal is not to exceed 90 days.
Id.art. 21, at 1238.
Id.
Id. art. 22, at 1239. The DSB keeps under surveillance the concessions.
Id. art. 25, at 1242.
Id.
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4.

Developing and Least Developed Countries

The provisions with regard to developing and least developed countries
(LDCs) 147 have retained their general substance. When a LDC has a trade
conflict, both the opposing party and the Director-General of GATT have
special obligations to the LDC. 14 ' At every stage of the dispute settlement
proceedings, a potential party in conflict should give particular consideration49
to the status and circumstances of a LDC that is party to the dispute.
That is, the opposing party should restrain from raising claims against a LDC
if at all possible. 5 ' The Director-General should give personal attention
to encouraging a satisfactory dispute between a LDC and an opposing party
in order to avoid formal dispute resolution before a GATT panel.'' If a
claim must be brought and the panel finds that the LDC nullified or impaired
another Member's rights under GATT, the injured party should seek the least
damaging remedies; that52 is, it should not ask for compensation or
authorization to retaliate.
V

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE

1994 CHANGES

The credibility and use of the dispute settlement procedures have
Now that
fluctuated over nearly half a century of GATT's existence.'
there have been significant alterations to solve the problems of GATT 1947,
147. They are collectively referenced as LDCs.
148. See generally 1994 Understanding, supra note 131, art. 24, at 1242.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. Such involvement by the Director-General is to be by the request of the LDC.
Additionally, the Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the above
assistance, may consult any source which either deems appropriate. Id.
152. Id.
153. See HUDEC, supranote 93, at 216-40 (1975); see also Davey, supranote 6, at 61-65
(giving a historical overview of the success of the dispute settlement under Article XXIII).
During the years 1948 to 1958, the procedures were generally recognized as beneficial. Id.
at 61. The decade of success is attributable to two factors: "First, the General Agreement had
only recently been negotiated and there was a general consensus on what it meant and how
it should be interpreted. Second, the number of GATT members was relatively small and their
backgrounds and interests were relatively similar." Id. at 62.
During the years 1959 to 1978, the "system fell into disrepute and disuse," especially
by the United States. Id. at 62-63. The disrepute, or decline in respect, was partly because
of the flaws in the system that were exacerbated by particularly difficult cases, such as the
DISC case between the EC and the United States. Id. at 64. In that case, appointment of the
panel took almost three years, and the panel decision was generally disfavored. Id.
The disuse was because: first, with the formation of the EC institutions, EC members
had an alternative forum to settle their disputes; second, when particularly controversial
provisions, such as those for agriculture, were ignored, the members fostered the attitude that
none of the GATT provisions were strictly enforceable; and, third, GATT developed a
significantly different face with the addition of developing countries. Id. at 63 n.50.
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it is claimed that some problems will remain and that new problems have
been created. Potential or often-espoused disadvantages to the 1994 system
are: (1) controversy over the current role of GATT; (2) demise of the GATT
system from insolvable conflict; and (3) threats to U.S. sovereignty.
A.

Controversy over GAIT's Role

The disrepute and disuse of GATT are overlaid with the controversy
about the role of GATT - whether GATT was intended to or should now
operate as a judicial body as opposed to a diplomatic body.'54 The
controversy has been voiced by two polar positions, one asserting that GATT
should reflect and operate as a judicial body decreeing binding pronouncements, the other asserting that GATT should be nothing more than a
diplomatic body encouraging private negotiation and institutional non-binding
settlements. The United States and developing countries have generally taken
the first position, which was ultimately reflected in the Dunkel Draft and the
1994 agreement, while the EC and Japan have generally taken the latter
Mexico and Canada have appeared to have mixed positions in
position.'
the middle of the two polarities.'56
The fact is that under GATT 1994, the dispute resolution procedures
reflect a legal system more so than ever in the history of GATT. The
substantive provisions of GATT will be more strictly enforceable than the
provisions of GATT 1947. After the 1994 procedures are fully in use, no
single country will be allowed to block an unfavorable decision.
Developing and least developed countries (LDCs) favor these changes
because they equalize, to some extent, the trading field. LDCs claim that the
changes will encourage neutral determination rather than economic tyranny
by superpowers. For example, a LDC could bring the United States, Canada,

154. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIsPUTEs 11-23 (1978).
STEWART, supra note 79, at 60-65. In a chart, Stewart presents 10 issues and the
position of the Dunkel Draft, the United States, the EC, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and
developing countries (including, "among others, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Korea, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela"). Id. at 65. The
10 issues include: right to panel, arbitration, adoption of panel reports, implementation of
adopted reports, compensation and retaliation, appellate review, rights of third parties, nonviolation complaints, commitment to refrain from unilateral action, and treatment of
developing and less/least developed countries. Id. at 60-65. For example, on the issue of
adoption of panel reports, the position of the Dunkel Draft and the United States was for
automatic adoption unless there was a consensus to reject the report. Id. at 60. The position
of the developing countries was adoption by consensus but with removal of the disputing
parties from the vote. Id. at 61 (citing Argentina's position). The position of Canada was
automatic adoption with an interim review stage. Id. The position of Mexico was adoption
by consensus with the disputing parties retaining the choice to vote in the adoption. Id. The
position of EC and Japan was basically status quo: adoption by consensus. Id.
156. Id. at 60-65.
155.
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and Japan into dispute resolution and receive a favorable panel report. The
developed country could no longer unilaterally block the report from
adoption. However, the field is not entirely equalized, because the panel as
a whole will probably still reflect the positions of developed countries even
though the LDC can choose a citizen of its country to sit on the panel.
Additionally, if the LDC does obtain a favorable panel report, the developed
country may choose not to comply. In this instance, the LDC could remove
concessions or obtain authority to retaliate. On balance, the United States
may determine that retaliation coming from a LDC may be less harmful than
complying with the recommendations of the panel report.'57 If this
scenario occurs, an interesting result would be to see whether other
developed countries would put diplomatic pressure on the noncomplying
developed country to comply with the report or whether internal political
parties and private industries would put domestic pressure on the developed
country to comply with the panel report."5
B.

Demise of the GATT System

GATT's stability could be threatened by a member's noncompliance with
a panel report or by a withdrawal from membership. Specifically, if the
United States refuses to comply with a panel recommendation that has been
adopted and unsuccessfully appealed, will GATT collapse? Under the terms
of the 1947 agreement, a party to the dispute can agree to adopt an
unfavorable decision. For example, the oilseed dispute between the United
States and the EC, initiated in 1988, was resolved in GATT with a favorable
decision for the United States159 The report was adopted by consensus, and
the EC agreed to comply.16
The EC's voting against itself gave the
adoption of the panel report political legitimacy
Alternatively, a party can block an unfavorable decision without
conflicting with the terms of GATT 1947."' However, U.S. refusal under
the 1994 agreement is not authorized, thus a conflict would emerge - the
terms of GATT and a decision of the members versus a decision of a single

157. If it was reported that "A lady embezzled two million but was ordered to pay only one
million in retribution," her crime would have a profit margin, that is, if she did not receive
a harsh sentence. Her reputation would be ruined, but she could always move to a place
where her name was not known.
158. While the embezzler, can "hide," the United States cannot.
159. STEWART, supra note 79, at 828.
160. Id. However, the EC and the United States could not agree on how the United States
should be compensated. Id at 828 n. 125. Negotiations about proper compensation took an
additional two years. Id.
161. In this situation, diplomatic threats and negotiation become particularly important.
See, e.g., id. at 827 (discussing the canned fruit case in which the EC only agreed to reduce
subsidies after the United States threatened retaliation).
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member. Such a conflict could discredit the entire system if tolerated.
However, the traditional means of diplomatic pressure could be used by other
economic superpowers.
At one point it was possible for GATT to simply fold up. For example,
during its infancy, GATT certainly would not have retained its international
identity and authority if the United States, the EC, and Japan had
withdrawn. 62 However, the 1994 Agreement institutionalized GATT,
giving it a legal personality which includes immunity from suit, autonomy
from control of authority external to the WTO, and sovereignty over national
laws.163 Its identity is tied to an institution rather than the original parties.
C.

Threats to US. Sovereignty

Under the 1994 changes, U.S. sovereignty is more likely to be threatened
because the dispute settlement results are more mandatory than acclamatory.
There are, however, two significant types of safeguards to U.S. sovereignty:
those available to all members because they are included in GATT and those
that are U.S. specific because they originated in implementing legislation.
1. GATT Safeguards
The GATT safeguards include the lowered standard of review, the
availability of appeal, and the possibility of waiver. The standard of review
in the 1994 anti-dumping procedures is more favorable to the national
decision than to the position of the complainant." 6 The panel could uphold
countries' differing interpretations of GATT provisions as long as they
constitute permissible interpretations of GATT. Thus, a member's national
interpretation will not be scrutinized based on another country's interpretation.
If a country believes that a panel decision was incorrectly decided, it can
appeal. However, a significant concern is that every time a member loses,
it will simply appeal, resulting in an overall loss of prestige and respect for
panel decisions. The presence of the Appellate Body is not likely to rob the'
panel of prestige because every decision is not likely to be appealed for the
.same reasons that a majority of cases in the United States that are tried are
not appealed. Appeals expend considerable time and resources. In addition,
objective reflection may support a high likelihood that the trial decision will
162. HUDEC, supra note 154, at 22.
163. GAIT, supra note 4, art. XVI 4. Peter Sutherland did state that GATT would need
swift U.S. approval, and "[u]ntil the WTO Agreement is ratified and implemented ... it is
little more than an uncashed cheque." GATT Focus, no. 110 (Aug.-Sept. 1994).
164. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. The standard of review recognizes that
there are, in many cases, several interpretations that could be reached. Therefore, if the
national administrative body interpreted GATT in a permissible manner, the GATT panel will
defer.
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be upheld. It is actually conceivable that instead of reducing the prestige of
the panel, the appellate process will put more prestige in "the system" as a
whole by re-instilling some of the confidence that was diminished after
GATT's first decade with regard to the system's fairness and ultimate
compliance with the rules.
Under GATT 1994, the rules resemble a traditional legal system in more
ways than one. In addition to the panel reports being adopted automatically,
which cuts against a nation's sovereignty, a defeated party can seek a waiver
of its obligations, which can protect a nation's sovereignty. GATT permits
its obligations to be waived in exceptional circumstances by a two-thirds
favorable vote of the contracting parties. 65 Under the 1947 system, the
waiver provision was unnecessary with regard to panel decisions, because the
displeased party could, in essence, unilaterally waive the decision by simply
blocking its adoption. Because consensus is not a requirement for report
adoption under GATT 1994, a member has an underlying duty to comply
with the panel decision and, ultimately, GATT rules. However, the member
could seek permission for noncompliance. The end result of the GATT 1947
provisions of blocking the initial obligation is the same as the GATT 1994
provisions of having an obligation and getting it waived, but the latter is an
action by two-thirds of the members, as opposed to one member. In
addition, it recognizes an express exception to the substantive requirements
of GATT, as opposed to overlooking the underlying requirements.
There will be situations where the United States or other countries
will lose cases which they should lose, but also there will be cases
where the United States and others will lose cases they did not
deserve to lose. . . . This is not different from domestic legal
processes. Nevertheless, in the broader context, there is a great deal
of utility in a credible and efficient, rule-oriented settlement system
that has integrity, and the United States is an important beneficiary
of such a system."
Ultimately, "[t]he WTO is in no way an assault on any country's sovereignty.
If anything it enhances it by providing a more effective dispute settlement
mechanism through which countries can ensure that their rights are

165. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXV 5.
166. The GATT Lady Sings: What the New WTO Will Meanfor the U.S. and World Trade,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at d6 (Apr. 12, 1994) (quoting John H. Jackson).
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respected ... ,67

2.

U.S. Safeguards

There are three express U.S. safeguards in the implementing legislation
for GATT 1994, and there is one proposal being debated in 1995. The first
safeguard emphasizes that U.S. law prevails over conflicting provisions of the
General Agreement, 168 even though the 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures states that
[e]ach Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or
particular character, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions
of this
169
Agreement as they may apply to the Member in question.
Furthermore, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Kantor has noted that the
language of the trade agreement reinforces this assertion: "Articles IX and X
of the WTO agreement make it clear that no substantive right or obligation
of the United States can be altered or changed unless we agree."'' 70 The
substantive decisions of the WTO will continue to be made by consensus,
and the procedural conflicts taken to the DSB will be made by panelists

167. Ratification Status of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, GATT Focus,
No. 110, 7 (Aug.-Sept. 1994).
168. H.R. REP. No. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(a) (1994). Section 102(a) reads as
follows:
(1)UNITED STATES LAW TO PREVAIL IN CONFLICT.- No provision of any
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any
person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall
have effect.
(2) CONSTRUCTION. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed (A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, including any law
relating to (i) the protection of human, animal, or plant live or health,
(ii) the protection of the environment, or
(iii) worker safety, or
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States,
including section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, unless specifically provided for
in this Act.
Id.
169. 1994 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 50, pt. XI, art. 32 5.
170. Documents Relating to the Clinton Administration'sAgreement with Sen. Robert Dole
(R-Kan.) Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement Issued by the White House Nov. 23,
1994, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1865, 1867 (Nov. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Dole Agreement].
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approved by the United States.1 7 1
The second safeguard is a congressional committee vote on whether a
panel report respects U.S. law and should be complied with. 72 Although
the vote is not binding on the agency, it may be considered persuasive.
The third safeguard is an expedited procedure to withdraw the United
States from participation in GATT, similar to the fast-track procedure to
accede the United States to a trade agreement. 173 Under this provision, the
withdrawal could be based on a report to be issued every five years that is
to outline the effects of the WTO on the United States with cost-benefit
measures. 74 Additionally, "the WTO agreement permits the United States
'' 75
to withdraw on six months' notice at any time and for any reason."
The proposed safeguard, which has been "strongly criticized by other
GATT participants,"' 76 is to establish a WTO Dispute Settlement Review
171. Id.
172. H.R. REP. No. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 124(g) (1994), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4809, 4832. This section provides, in relevant part:
(1) CHANGES IN AGENCY REGULATIONS OR PRACTICE. - In any case in
which a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report that a
regulation or practice of a department or agency of the United States is inconsistent
with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the regulation or practice may not be
amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified in the implementation of such report
unless and until (A) the appropriate congressional committees have been consulted ... ;
(B) the Trade Representative has sought advice ... from relevant private sector
advisory committees...;
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has provided an opportunity
for public comment...;
(D) The Trade Representative has submitted to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing the proposed modification ... ;
(E) the Trade Representative and the head of the relevant department or agency
have consulted with the appropriate congressional committees ... ; and
(F) the final rule or other modification has been published in the Federal
Register....
(3) VOTE BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. -..
.[T]he Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance
of the Senate may vote to indicate the agreement or disagreement of the committee
with the proposed contents of the final role or other modification. Any such vote
shall not be binding on the department or agency which is implementing the rule or
other modification.
(4) INAPPLICABILITY TO ITC. - This subsection does not apply to any
regulation or practice of the International Trade Commission.
Id.
173. H.R. REp. No. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 125 (1994). Section 125 outlines a
procedure of withdraw from the WTO Agreement, which is authorized under Section 101.
174. H.R. REP. No. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 125(a)(2) (1994).
175. Dole Agreement, supra note 170, at 1867.
176. U.S. Backing Puts New Trade Era on Track, but Questions Still Remain, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1895 (Dec. 7, 1994) (quoting 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1830 (Nov. 30,
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Commission, which will vigorously monitor WTO dispute settlement
decisions to ensure that they do not adversely affect U.S. sovereignty.'77
The Commission will be comprised of five federal appellate judges' 78 and
will review all adopted WTO panel reports 7 9 that are adverse to U.S.
interests. The Commission is to conduct a hearing, at which the U.S.
Government and other interested parties may present their case, and to
determine whether the panel has failed to comply with the terms of GATT
and whether such failure materially affected the outcome of the panel
report.'8 0 If the Commission makes an affirmative determination as to both
issues, the President may attempt to re-negotiate a specific panel decision,' 8 ' and if there are repeated affirmative determinations, Congress
would be able to use the expedited withdraw provisions of the implementing
legislation. "82
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the event a party is faced with injury from another country's dumping
or subsidy activity, it may pursue ADDs, countermeasures, or CVDs.
Regardless of which avenue it must take, it may ultimately be making a

1994)).
177. Dole Agreement, supra note 170, at 1867. Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.) is proposing
the legislation.
178. Id. The appellate judges will be "appointed by the President in consultation with the
Leadership of both Houses and the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Ways & Means
and Finance Committees. Id. Each Commissioner would have a four-year term with possible
renewals. Id. at 1868. And provision will be made for appropriate staggering of the terms
of the Commissioners. Id at 1866-68.
179. Id. at 1868. This would not include reports by the Appellate Body or decisions by
the panel that had been appealed. Id.
180. Id. at 1867-68. The proposed legislative provisions in Kantor's letter states that the
Commission would have to determine whether the panel or Appellate Body:
Demonstrably exceeded its authority or terms of reference or, where the
1.
matter concerned the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement, failed to apply
Article 17.6 concerning standard of review;
Added to the obligations or diminished the rights of the United States
2.
assumed under the pertinent Uruguay Round Agreement;
Acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in misconduct, or
3.
demonstrably departed from the procedures specified for panels or the Appellate
Body in the agreements; and whether
The action in 1, 2, or 3 materially affects the outcome of the report.
4.
Id.at 1868.
181. Id. Such a request for re-negotiation would be initiated in Congress through a joint
resolution and would be expedited under the same Section 125 procedures as withdraw. Id
(citingH.R. REP. No. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 125(b)(1) (1994)).
182. After three affirmative determinations in a five-year period, Congress could introduce
a joint resolution, which if passed and signed by the President, would commence withdraw
from GATT. Dole Agreement, supra note 170, at 1868.
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claim or defending itself in front of a GATT panel. In defense of its
nationally imposed ADDs, the favorable standard of review added to GATT
1994 is what it will focus on. In seeking authorization from GATT for
countermeasures, it will benefit from the automatic adoption of the panel
report, in the event the report is favorable; or it will benefit from the right
of appeal, in the event the report is not favorable. In defense if its nationally
imposed CVDs, it will have the option to use GATT's general dispute
resolution procedures which have been significantly enhanced by: strict time
restraints on settlement phases; a right to have a panel established; an
automatic adoption of the panel report; the right to appeal the report; the
possibility of authorized cross-agreement retaliation; and the opportunity to
resort to arbitration over the time allotted for compliance with recommendations.
The WTO will act as an comprehensive and undivided organization for
the substance of the Multilateral Trade Agreements and for the procedures
of dispute settlement, thus, "enshrining the rule of law in international
economic and trade relations [and] setting universal rules and disciplines over
the temptations of unilateralism and the law of the jungle."'183 The dispute
settlement procedures have become clearer and more binding. "The Uruguay
Round's new dispute settlement mechanism represents the new teeth of the
...WTO."' ' 4 With such efficient enforcement, there is a sacrifice - the
United States will not always be on the beneficial end of the automatic
adoption rule. While this may be detrimental to the United States in regard
to a particular case, it will not pose a threat to U.S. sovereignty because of
GATT institutional and U.S. legislative safeguards. Ultimately, the 1994
changes in dispute settlement will rise as the central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. 18 5

183. GATT Focus, no. 107 (May 1994) (quoting a speech by His Majesty King Hassan II
at the closing ceremony on April 15, 1994).
184. Id.
185. See 1994 Understanding, supra note 131.
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